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response in the United States. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) continue to improve capabilities and coordination with one another but still have gaps that lack clarity, affect response times, limit information sharing, and cause incident command confusion. This "seam of uncertainty" exists where the DoD homeland defense mission overlaps with DHS homeland security. 1 The US dedicated itself to meet and close these seams to better prevent, prepare, respond, and recover from future events that challenge our response enterprise. What improvements are needed in the CBRNE Response Enterprise and National Response Framework to enhance our ability to respond and recover from natural and manmade disasters?
HOMELAND SECURITY AND HOMELAND DEFENSE: THE SEAM OF UNCERTAINTY UNSTITCHED?
…we will not be able to deter or prevent every single threat. That is why we must also enhance our resilience-the ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover from disruption.
-President Barack Obama In 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused unprecedented damage across multiple state and local governments, challenged our emergency preparedness, and ultimately demonstrated how quickly our civilian and military first responders could be overextended in large natural disasters. These two separate events became the focal response incidents on which to base our national response enterprise for the federal government. In the past ten years the government established or combined multiple agencies and vertical layers to improve our planning, execution, and recovery from disasters. The DoD, playing a supporting role in Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), also established a new command to assist in natural and man-made disasters.
DSCA adds a second mission space apart from DoD"s Homeland Defense mission and the protection of US sovereignty and territory. This paper intends to study the ends, ways, and means and identify shortcomings where the seams between Homeland Security and Homeland Defense become apparent in preventing, protecting, responding to, and recovering from natural and manmade disasters. Current strategic policies represent our desired ends; the policies" application represent the ways; and the agencies and units required to accomplish the CBRNE response mission represent the means. After reviewing the response enterprise from the top down the paper intends to identify the capability gaps that still remain in the enterprise and make recommendations for their improvement.
The New York Example
As one of the most targeted cities for terrorism, New York City invested more than $3 billion dollars to address the terrorism threat and make it a difficult target for future acts. In a 60 Minutes interview aired on 25 September 2011, Raymond Kelly, the New York Police Commissioner, reviewed the personnel, equipment, and tactics the city uses to deter and respond to emergencies. The city employs over 35,000 uniformed police officers, maintains well over 2,000 cameras, and uses swarming techniques to take over city blocks. It constantly monitors the harbor and vehicles entering the city with sensitive radiological detectors and software that recognizes potential hazards on the streets. To gather intelligence on emerging threats, the city employs linguists in sixty languages across the world. 3 These linguists report back to the city"s counterterrorism group, where their information is used to develop estimates on activities.
Intercepted phone calls from potential terrorists have confirmed these techniques are effective. To date it appears the city"s deterrence methods are working and would-be terrorists need to look elsewhere at less capable cities.
New York City stands as an example of how coordination, information sharing, and response units, when used together, close the seams between "prevent, prepare, respond and recover." NYC is one of the few cities in the US which commands a budget large enough to afford these capabilities, and can respond with little help from outside agencies. Other US cities and communities do not have the funds (or the constant terrorist threat), and will require assistance when man-made or natural disasters occur. For them, as suggested by New York"s example, the answer is a multilayered and partnered response. That answer is written throughout the documents discussed in this paper, but enacting the collaboration, information sharing, and capabilities of the players needed to execute that answer remains elusive.
The Ends: Interagency and Department of Defense Objectives for Emergency Response
The strategy for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense begins with national level objectives designed to communicate and promote collaboration within the government. These documents set the stage for combined strategy to protect the homeland and nest all the way down to the response level --or means-contained in the civil and military components of our Nation"s government.
The National Security Strategy (NSS) identifies threats at home in the United
States that include terrorism, natural disasters, cyber-attacks, and pandemics. 4 It provides the federal government"s objectives --or ends --based on current US priorities. The strategy calls for enhancing security at home and effectively managing emergencies through all levels of the government and the private sector. It calls for "individual and community preparedness and resilience through frequent engagement" that supplies clear information to the public. 5 As noted in the NSS, the US cannot expect to prevent or deter the potential damage caused by every terrorist plot or natural disaster. 6 To reduce an event"s effect, the NSS calls for investment in preparedness throughout all levels of government to include planning, equipping, and information sharing and collaboration across all response elements.
To build upon the guidance in the NSS, President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness, which established the national preparedness system. The system allows the nation "to track the progress of our ability to build and improve the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the Nation." 7 It looks into risks trends all over the Nation and "includes concrete, measureable, and prioritized objectives to mitigate the risk." 8 The risk data is placed in frameworks coordinated under a "unified system with common terminology" and built upon "basic plans that support an all-hazards approach to preparedness." The NIMS provides a proactive approach to organize the government, NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs), and the private sector to respond to and recover from disasters. It is based on the premise that the use of a common "incident management framework" will give emergency management/response personnel a flexible but standardized system for emergency management and incident response activities." 23 The system is based on five components: preparedness, communications and information management, resource management, command and management, and management and maintenance. The components concentrate on the ability to manage emergency personnel and equipment, maintain a common operating picture and interoperability, manage resources, and maintain command structure. It strives to produce a unified command where all players in a disaster work seamlessly toward a common goal to reduce the loss of life and property. The NIMS makes it clear that it is neither a response nor a communications plan, but a "comprehensive, nationwide, systematic approach to incident management, including the incident command system, multi-agency coordination systems, and public information." Joint Publication 3-27, Homeland Defense, gives an overall view of the HD mission but also explains the relationships with other agencies in the government to achieve mission success. It acknowledges the communication gaps during the events of 9-11 and stresses the transition from a ""need to know" to a "need to share" culture." where DoD fits in it. Finally, they take the lessons learned from 9-11 and Hurricane
Katrina to reinforce the need to share information across the response enterprise. The events of 9-11 and the lessons learned from hurricanes and other natural disasters forced the Federal government to review its response enterprise to garner a more robust response. The United States now has a very capable, well trained, and equipped response force for disasters, but there are numerous limitations to its current configuration. These limitations include proposed response times, common operating pictures, and general knowledge of and between DHS and NORTHCOM. These themes are common throughout all the documents previously explored in this paper.
Limitations to the Response Enterprise
While the United States adjusted the size and locations of units responsible for emergencies, the most important traits are rapid response, life-saving capabilities, the ability to share information, and the capacity to make timely decisions during a crisis.
This section explores some of the limitations in the processes and the response forces.
Military The HRF is in a similar position. Even with a response capability within twelve hours, the HRF faces a shortcoming by only maintaining 25% of its personnel in Title 32 operational status. 40 The HRF cannot assemble and deploy until the governor places them in State Active Duty (SAD). In an unanticipated event the HRF has 141 personnel immediately available for response, and some of those may not be part of the lifesaving capability. Even with the quick assembly time for the HRF, they can still expect to travel up to 500 miles to the incident site. Multiple incidents in the same FEMA region or on state borders can cause even greater problems. Governors may hesitate to acknowledge an Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) as they assess the damage and danger to their particular state. All of these considerations add precious time to the lifesaving capability the CERFP deliver.
The DCRF faces a greater challenge in relation to time. Domestic response, as with all DSCA, is driven by the Request For Assistance (RFA) process from civil authorities. 41 The President or the SECDEF direct the response to an RFA. It is forwarded to USNORTHCOM in accordance with the National Response Framework to support a primary agency, e.g., FEMA. 42 Once USNORTHCOM receives the order it may take up to 24 hours for the DCRF to begin movement to the incident site. The availability of air transport and proximity to the incident play a large factor on the success of the response. The initial 96 hours after an event offer the greatest opportunity to save lives and poses one of the greatest challenges. The brief called out the number one concern as "can we get there in time?" 44 To address the deployment timelines USNORTHCOM utilizes Deployment Readiness Exercises (DRE) as the key to measure a unit"s ability to deploy and its installation"s capability to support a deployment. 45 The notion of time also permeates the decisions state, local, municipal, and tribal leadership consider during an emergency. After an incident occurs it is imperative the leadership in the community or state receives the best timely information to make informed decisions. According to the National Response Framework "incidents must be managed at the lowest possible jurisdictional level and supported by capabilities when needed." 46 Immediately following an unanticipated event the ability to receive accurate information can prove challenging. While the local authorities and first responders react to the event they may not know if the incident exceeds their capabilities. As the NRF states, "it is not always obvious at the outset whether a seemingly minor event might be the initial phase of a larger, rapidly growing threat." 47 Gaps still exist within the intelligence community and DHS due to an inability to supply a single enterprise information system that meets the requirements for all.
The enterprise suffers from several factors that inhibit its information sharing and networking. Security clearances, over classification, and governance issues, all contribute to a lack of integration and interoperability. For the enterprise to truly be responsive it requires the ability to access and share information not just vertically but horizontally.
One of the most critical factors that hamper information sharing in the intelligence community is the governance issue. DHS as it operates now "is poorly positioned to receive intelligence from the intelligence community agencies because it does not do intelligence collection on its own." 53 Without political support from the Congress and control of a budget, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) cannot break down the stove pipes and the resistance to reform that exists in the intelligence communities.
54
No one in the intelligence community has the ability to collect and process all the available information into actionable intelligence. 55 To remedy this shortfall and transform the community the DNI needs to establish a new community based on collaboration and abolish the current rivalries. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 is an example of reform that streamlined the command structure within DoD. It created a "unified military establishment and, among other things, laid the foundations for a "joint"
military." 56 A similar act from the Congress could establish a more collective intelligence environment. The act could break down the barriers of the "need to know" culture past the "need to share" and into a mindset of "responsibility to provide". 57 These communities need to overcome past biases and provide threat information across the enterprise while protecting the source.
Before any intelligence is provided the community must also confront security clearance issues. There is an "inability or unwillingness on the part of DHS and FBI to work effectively together" on this issue. 58 procedures that deal with the designation of these documents. 61 The SBU documents are of "particular importance to homeland security," but the designations are "misapplied and disjointed." 62 This lack of understanding on classifying material is a serious impediment to sharing information. According to the 2006 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 06-385, the government used fifty-six different SBU designations and applied them on information that did not warrant classification. 63 This misuse of classification denies state and local fusion centers the ability to act on intelligence that may affect their community or even add their own information and build upon it. If a cleared operator in a fusion center receives classified information they cannot declassify and share it with others. Even with an emphasis in our strategic documents on information sharing, "making information available to participants (people, processes, or systems)," there is still a tendency for agencies to limit their dissemination procedures with one another. Unfortunately, DHS launched the system without studying the current environment and evaluating the systems used by the states and local communities. 66 They failed to consider the existence of other systems already used in the field by law enforcement, such as the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES), Law Enforcement Online (LEO), and an oversight mechanism incorporating these systems. 67 HSIN not only overlooked law enforcement systems, it failed to consider the more than fifteen different Emergency
Operating Center (EOC) software options used in the states. 68 The oversights highlighted the fact that the system lacked integration with state EOCs. 69 In addition, studies indicated it had privacy issues, was not user friendly, and did not handle all events expected. 70 As a result of these pronounced shortcomings, DHS saw a requirement to establish a Homeland Security Information Network Advisory Committee (HSINAC). 71 The HSINAC meets to gather information on the HSIN, and works to enhance and promote information sharing. The committee recognized its main obstacles to be "cross boundary and cultural issues…across jurisdictions, levels, and functions of government." 72 DHS acknowledges the existence of duplicative systems, but has no authority to enforce the use of HSIN. When questioned on law enforcement use of HSIN, the HSINAC admitted most of those agencies use LEO and RISS systems, and there would not be a change for the next few years. 73 Law enforcement"s concern with HSIN was information overload with duplicative systems, and the need for DOJ and DHS to work together to eliminate competing systems for state and local users. 74 The primary DoD HSIN user, the National Guard, only posts to HSIN when it is approved by leadership, due to authentication, security concerns, and systems access. 75 These limiting factors of the HSIN challenge the preparedness of the nation to share intelligence and respond to a natural or manmade disaster.
Conclusion
Since the terrorist events of 2001 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Federal Government focused efforts "aimed at strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation". 76 National preparedness not only involves response but a whole of government collaboration focused on "prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery." 77 USNORTHCOM plans to train and equip smaller, more responsive units, which are more closely tied to the civil agencies they support. While the government is better prepared for natural and man-made disasters, it still lacks the information and intelligence sharing capability needed to prevent and respond to these events. There is still a substantial gap between the intelligence community and DHS, and their ability to collaborate with local law enforcement and fusion centers in the states. Incidents begin and end locally, but to achieve true success there is a need to involve "multiple jurisdictions, levels of government, functional agencies, and/or emergency responder disciplines." 78 There is a "seam of uncertainty" in the response enterprise, but it appears to be in collaboration, not in mission overlap. In the past ten years the government identified and closed seams in response and recovery by establishing DHS, USNORTHCOM, and their associated units. The remaining seam involves our information sharing capacity and collaboration.
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